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Abstract 
Today  network  security,  uptime  and  performance  of  network  are  important  and  serious  issue  in  computer 
network.  Anomaly  is  deviation  from  normal  behavior  which  is  factor  that  affects  on  network  security.  So 
Anomaly  Extraction  which  detects  and  extracts  anomalous  flow  from  network  is  requirement  of  network 
operator.  Anomaly  extraction  refers  to  automatically  finding  in  a  large  set  of  flows  observed  during  an 
anomalous  time  interval,  the  flows  associated  with  the  anomalous  event(s).  It  is  important  for  root  cause 
analysis, network forensics, and attack mitigation and anomaly modeling. We use meta data provided by several 
histogram based detectors to identify  suspicious flows, and then apply association rule  mining to  find and 
summarize  anomalous  flows.  Using  Histogram  based  detector  to  identify  anomalies  and  then  applying 
Association rule mining, anomalies will be extracted. Apriori and FP Growth algorithm will be used to generate 
the set of rule applied on metadata. Using traffic data from a network this technique effectively finds the flow 
associated with the anomalous event(s). it triggers a very small number of false positives, which exhibit specific 
patterns and can be sorted out by an administrator this anomaly extraction method significantly reduces the 
work hours needed for analyzing alarms, making anomaly detection systems more practical. 
Keywords – Anomaly Extraction, Association Rules, computer network, data mining, Apriori Algorithm,FP 
Growth Algorithm. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
An  anomaly  detection  system  may  provide 
meta-data  relevant  to  an  alarm  that  help  to  narrow 
down  the  set  of  candidate  anomalous  flows.  For 
example,  anomaly  detection  systems  analyzing 
histograms  may  indicate  the  histogram  bins  that  an 
anomaly affected, e.g., a range of IP addresses or port 
numbers. Such meta-data can be used to restrict the 
candidate  anomalous  flows  to  these  that  have  IP 
addresses or port numbers within the affected range. 
To extract anomalous flows, one could build a model 
describing  normal  flow  characteristics  and  use  the 
model to identify deviating flows. However, building 
such a microscopic model is very challenging due to 
the wide variability of flow characteristics. Similarly, 
one could compare flows during an interval with flows 
from normal or past intervals and search for changes, 
like new flows that were not previously observed or 
flows  with  significant  increase/decrease  in  their 
volume. Such approaches essentially perform anomaly 
detection at the level of individual flows and could be 
used to identify anomalous flows.  
Anomaly  detection  techniques  are  the  last 
line of defense when other approaches fail to detect 
security  threats  or  other  problems.  They  have  been 
extensively  studied  since  they  pose  a  number  of 
interesting  research  problems,  involving  statistics, 
modeling, and efficient data structures. Nevertheless, 
they have not yet gained widespread adaptation, as a 
number of challenges, like reducing the number of  
 
false positives or simplifying training and calibration, 
remain to be solved. 
 
II.  PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Aim of this system is to identify an anomaly 
from  the  network  traffic  during  a  time  interval  and 
find  the  flows  associated  with  the  event(s)  that 
triggered an observed anomaly.  
 
2.1 EXISTING SYSTEM 
Identifying network anomalies is critical for 
the timely mitigation of events, like attacks or failures 
that  can  affect  the  security  and  performance  of 
network. Traditional approaches to anomaly detection 
use  attack  signatures  built  in  an  Intrusion  Detection 
System  (IDS)  that  can  identify  attacks  with  known 
patterns. Significant research efforts have focused on 
building  IDS’s  and,  therefore,  related  production 
systems  are  presently  employed  in  many  networks. 
Although signature-based detection finds most known 
attacks,  it  fails  to  identify  new  attacks  and  other 
problems  that  have  not  appeared  before  and  do  not 
have known signatures. 
A  number  of  studies  have  focused  on 
developing volume-based anomaly detection schemes 
[2]–[7]. For example, Barford et al. [2] used wavelets 
to  distinguish  between  predictable  and  anomalous 
traffic volume changes. More recently, Zhang et al. [6] 
introduced a general framework that aims to identify 
anomalies  from  network-wide  link  load  traffic  data. 
These studies are successful in identifying anomalies 
that  result  in  (network-wide)  traffic  volume 
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deviations.  However,  they  are  not  so  effective  in 
detecting  stealth  attacks,  such  as  low-rate  port 
scanning, that do not result in notable traffic volume 
changes. 
The  anomaly  detection  scheme  by  Guet  al. 
[10]  uses  a  single  composite  feature  distribution  to 
characterize traffic and computes a parametric model 
of  the  distribution  using  training  data.  Observed 
network traffic is, then, compared to the constructed 
model to identify anomalies. The authors assume that 
the training data-set does not contain any anomalies. 
The  proposed  anomaly  detection  scheme  uses 
Principal  Component  Analysis  (PCA)  to  identify  an 
orthogonal  basis  along  which  the  measurement  data 
exhibit the highest variance. The principal components 
with  high  variance  model  the  normal  behavior  of  a 
network, whereas the remaining components of small 
variance are used to identify and classify anomalies. 
The  proposed  scheme  aims  at  ﬁnding  anomalies  in 
large  backbone  networks  and,  consequently, 
aggregates  traffic  into  origin-destination  (OD)  ﬂows 
between network ingress and egress points. But it is 
hard  to  select  the  right  number  of  principal 
components  to  achieve:  1)  a  low  false-positive  rate 
and 2) a subspace of PCA components 
 that  is  anomaly-free. 
 
2.2 PROPOSED SYSTEM 
Our  system  contains  three  different  phases. 
One  is  histogram  detector  that  will  observe  the 
network  traffic  and  alert  the  system  upon  anomaly 
detection. Second phase consists of histogram cloning 
which  assures  the  anomaly  detection  and  finds  the 
suspicious  flows  from  network  traffic.  Finally  third 
phase is to apply association rule mining algorithm i.e. 
FP Growth to find the frequent item sets. 
 
Process Summary: 
1]  Form  network  between  computers  or  laptops. 
2] Histogram detector will observe network for certain 
interval. 
3] On anomaly detection form clones of histogram and 
find  suspicious  flows  in              network. 
4]  Apply  FP  Growth  algorithm  to  this  suspicious 
flows. 
5] Find frequent item sets from the set of suspicious 
flows. 
We build a histogram-based detector for our 
evaluation  that  uses  the  Kullback–Leibler  (KL) 
distance to detect anomalies. Each histogram detector 
monitors  a  ﬂow  feature  distribution,  like  the 
distribution  of  source  ports  or  destination  IP 
addresses.  We  assume  n  histogram-based  detectors 
that correspond to n different traffic features and have 
each m histogram bins. 
As  an  alternative  to  arbitrary  binning,  we  introduce 
histogram cloning. With histogram cloning, different 
clones  provide  alternative  ways  to  group  feature 
values into a desired number of bins/groups creating 
effectively additional views along which an anomaly 
may  be  visible.  The  cloning  mechanism  is  coupled 
with  a  simple  voting  scheme  that  controls  the 
sensitivity  of  the  detector  and  eventually  affects  a 
tradeoff between false positives and negatives.  
Assume a time interval with an anomaly. Pre 
ﬁltering selects all ﬂows that match the union of the 
meta-data Vj provided by n detectors, i.e., all ﬂows 
that  match  where  are  ﬁltered.  Pre  ﬁltering  usually 
removes  a  large  part  of  the  normal  traffic.  This  is 
desirable  for  two  reasons.  First,  it  generates  a 
substantially  smaller  dataset  that  results  in  faster 
processing in the following steps. Second, it improves 
the accuracy of association rule mining by removing 
ﬂows that could result in false-positive item-sets. 
Here,  we apply the  ﬁrst  step of association 
rule mining, i.e., we ﬁnd frequent item-sets to extract 
anomalous ﬂows from a large set of ﬂows observed 
during  a  time  interval.  The  standard  algorithm  for 
discovering  frequent  item-sets  is  the  Apriori 
algorithm. 
 
III.  OBJECTIVE 
Identifying an anomaly from the network traffic 
during a time interval and find the flows associated 
with the event(s) that triggered an observed anomaly. 
 
FIG.1 ANOMALY EXTRACTION PATH 
 
In this project, we are observing the network 
traffic for time interval t and identifying the anomaly 
using histogram detector. Upon detection of anomaly, 
we  build  the  clones  of  histogram  detector  and  find 
suspicious flows that causes anomaly in the network. 
We then filter this data to eliminate large fraction of 
normal flows. A summary report of frequent item-sets 
in the set of suspicious flows is generated by applying 
association rule mining. 
 
IV.  LITERATURE SURVEY 
F,  Silveira  and  Diot  [1]  introduced  a  tool 
called  URCA  that  searches  for  anomalous  flows  by 
iteratively eliminating subsets of normal flows. URCA 
also  classifies  the  type  of  a  detected  anomaly. 
Nevertheless,  it  requires  to  repeatedly  evaluating  an 
anomaly detector on different flow subsets, which can 
be  costly.  Compared  to  this  work,  we  simply 
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Do Witcher [2] is a scalable system for worm 
detection and containment in backbone networks. Part 
of  the  system  automatically  constructs  a  flow-filter 
mask  from  the  intersection  of  suspicious  attributes 
(meta-data)  provided  by  different  detectors  leverage 
suspicious  attributes  from  an  anomaly  detector  and 
study the anomaly extraction problem in more depth. 
We  highlight  that  using  the  intersection  can  miss 
anomalous flows and find that the union of the meta-
data  combined  with  association  rule  mining  gives 
better results.  
Dewaele  et  al.    [3]  use  sketches  to  create 
multiple  random  projections  of  a  traffic  trace,  then 
model    the    marginal’s    of    the    sub  traces    using  
Gamma    laws  and    identify    deviations  in    the 
parameters  of  the  models as anomalies. In addition, 
their  method  finds  possible  anomalous  source  or 
destination IP addresses by taking the intersection of 
the addresses hashing into anomalous sub traces.  
Compared  to  this  work,  we  introduce  and  validate 
techniques to address the more challenging problem of 
finding anomalous flows rather than IP addresses.  
Lakhina et al. [4] use SNMP data to detect 
network-wide volume anomalies and to pinpoint the 
origin-destination (OD) flow along which an anomaly 
existed. In contrast, our approach takes as input a large 
number of flow records, e.g., standard 5-tuple flows, 
and  extracts  anomalous  flows.  An  OD  flow  may 
include  millions  of  both  normal  and  anomalous  5-
tuple flows and, therefore, can form the input to our 
methodology.  
Li et al. [5], use sketches to randomly aggregate flows 
as an alternative to OD aggregation. The authors show 
that  random  aggregation  can  detect  more  anomalies 
than  OD aggregation in the  PCA subspace anomaly 
detection method. In addition, the authors discuss how 
their  method  can  be  used  for  anomaly  extraction. 
However, the work and evaluation focus primarily on 
anomaly detection.  
Lee  and  Stolfo  [6]  show  how  association 
rules  can  be  used  to  extract  interesting  intrusion 
patterns from system calls and tcp dump logs.  
Vaarandi [7] introduces a tool called LogHound that 
provides an optimized implementation of Apriori and 
demonstrates  how  LogHound  can  be  used  to 
summarize traffic flow records.  
Yoshida et al. [8] also use frequent item-set mining to 
identify interesting events in traces from the MAWI 
traffic archive.  
Li and Deng [9] outline a variant of the Eclat 
frequent item-set mining algorithm] that operates in a 
sliding  window  fashion  and  evaluate  it  using  traffic 
flow traces from a Chinese university.  
Chandola  and  Kumar  [10]  describe  heuristics  for 
finding  a  minimal  set  of  frequent  item-sets  that 
summarizes a large set of flows.  
Mahoney and Chan [11] use association rule 
mining  to  find  rare  events  that  are  suspected  to 
represent  anomalies  in  packet  payload  data.  They 
evaluate  their  method  on  the  1999  DARPA/Lincoln 
Laboratory  traces.  Their  approach  targets  edge 
networks  where  mining  rare  events  is  possible.  In 
massive backbone data, however, this approach is less 
promising. Another application of rule mining in edge 
networks  is  eXpose,  which  learns  fine-grained 
communication  rules  by  exploiting  the  temporal 
correlation  between  flows  within  very  short  time 
windows.  
Compared  to  these  studies,  association  rule 
mining  can  be  combined  with  anomaly  detection  to 
effectively  extract  anomalous  flows.  Hierarchical 
heavy-hitter detection methods [10], [7] group traffic 
into  hierarchical  clusters  of  high  resource 
consumption  and  focus  primarily  on  optimizing 
computational  performance  for  summarizing  normal 
traffic. For example, they have been used to identify 
clusters of Web servers in hosting farms. Hierarchical 
heavy-hitter  detection  is  similar  to  frequent  item-set 
mining in that both approaches find different forms of 
multidimensional  heavy  hitters.  Compared  to  these 
studies,  intelligently  combining  multidimensional 
heavy-hitters  with  anomaly  detection  enables  us  to 
extract anomalous flows. In addition, frequent item-set 
mining scales to higher dimensions much better than 
existing  hierarchical  heavy-hitter  detection  methods. 
Finally,  substantial  work  has  focused  on 
dimensionality  reduction  for  anomaly  detection  in 
backbone  network.  These  papers  investigate 
techniques  and  appropriate  metrics  for  detecting 
traffic  anomalies,  but  do  not  focus  on  the  anomaly 
extraction  problem  which  we  are  addressing  in  this 
project. 
 
V.  MATHEMATICAL MODEL 
1] U is main set of users (ATM Holders) like u1, u2, 
u3…. 
U = {u1, u2, u3…….} 
2] A is main set of Administrators like a1, a2, a3…. 
A = {a1, a2, a3…….} 
3] C is the main set of histogram clones like c1, c2, 
c3.... 
C = {c1, c2, c3......} 
4] Identify the processes as P. 
P = {Set of processes}  
P = {P1, P2, P3……} 
If (anomaly is detected in the network) 
then 
         P1 = {e1, e2, e3, e4} 
                  Where 
                      {e1=i|i  is  to  build  c  number  of 
clones}    
                       {e2=j|j  is  to  find  anomalous  bins 
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{e3=k|k is to filter suspicious data} 
                       {e4=l|l is to find frequent item sets 
from given suspicious data} 
Else 
P1 = {e1, e2} 
                    Where 
                      {e1=i|i is to observe network traffic 
during time interval t}    
                       {e2=j|j is to check whether anomaly 
detects or not} 
 
VI.  PROJECT SETUP 
Operating Environment:- 
a)  S/W Specification 
Operating System   :  Windows 7. 
Development End   :  JAVA [JDK 1.6] 
IDE             : Eclipse Helios 
Tool            : JCreator  
b)  H/W Specification 
Processor   : PIV– 500 MHz to 3.0 GHz. 
RAM   : 1GB. 
Disk  : 20 GB. 
Monitor   : Any Color Display. 
       Key Board     : Standard Windows Keyboard 
 
 
Fig.2 System Architecture 
 
VII.  DEVELOPMENT METHODOLOGY 
7.1 MODULE INFORMATION 
Module1: 
 Design  the  Graphical  User  Interface  (GUI)  for  our 
system with client and server. 
Module2:  
Build histogram detector to observe the traffic on the 
network and detect anomalies. 
Module3: 
Find  suspicious  flows  from  the  network  traffic  that 
causes anomaly in the network. 
Module4: 
Implement Apriori and FP Growth algorithm to find 
frequent item sets  
Approach Overview (3 steps) 
7.1.1 Detection:  
Use a number of histogram-based detectors: 
1.  Identify  affected  bins  and  create  set  V  of 
corresponding feature values 
2.  Use  histogram  cloning  to  reduce  collisions 
and false positives 
 
7.1.2 Filtering:  
Filter  flows  that  match  union  of  meta-data 
provided by N detectors 
1.  Filtered flows are called „suspicious“ flows 
 
7.1.3 Mining: 
Use  association  rules  to  extract  and  summarize 
anomalous flows from the set of suspicious flows 
 
Fig.3 Anomaly Extraction Steps 
 
7.2 Association Rule Mining 
Given a a number of itemsets, find frequent subsets 
which are common to at least a minimum number s of 
the  itemsets.  An  itemset  is  a  flow  (7-tuple):  {srcIP, 
dstIP, srcPort, dstPort, proto, #packets, #bytes} 
Key  intuition:  anomalies  trigger  a  large  number  of 
flows with one or more common feature values, e.g., 
src IP addr, dst port, #packets. Use modified Apriori 
algorithm to find frequent subset 
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
We are implementing FP Growth algorithm 
and Apriori algorithm to find out frequent item sets. 
We will compare the results of Apriori algorithm and 
FP  Growth  algorithm  and  show  how  FP  Growth 
algorithm achieves better results in reducing the time 
and space complexity and provides better optimization 
results  as  compared  to  Apriori  Algorithm. 
Implementation by FP Growth Algorithm will be the 
extension to our work.  
The proposed methodology is very useful for 
finding the root cause of detected anomalies,  which 
helps  in  anomaly  mitigation,  network  forensics  and 
anomaly modeling. 
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